I feel like a snaggle-toothed prophet
whose flayed skin
rests on my body
like that of a striped hipster.

story of my life. lol sufjan.

It's been a long, long time since I've memorized your face


It's been four hours now since I've wandered through your place

And when I sleep on your couch I feel very safe

And when you bring the blankets I cover up my face

I do love you

I do love you



And when you play guitar I listen to the strings buzz

The metal vibrates underneath your fingers

And when you crochet I feel mesmerized and proud

And I would say I love you, but saying it out loud is hard

So I won't say it at all

And I won't stay very long

But you are the life I needed all along

I think of you as my brother

Although that sounds dumb

Words are futile devices

hey tash what have you been doing for the last seven hours? this.

We live in a westernized society where power has become the means to validation; this is reflected in our capitalistic and consumerist culture, and additionally in many of our past and contemporary philosophies. One philosophical conundrum for those who like to think of themselves as in control of their lives, actions and behaviour, is that of free will. Philosophers C.A. Campbell and Robert Blatchford are two men with different idea’s regarding Determinism, or “free will”, and my idea’s also differ significantly from theirs, as will be illustrated in this essay; I will analyze the various philosophies in respect to moral responsibility, free will, and determinism, and will hopefully elucidate upon the variance of each philosopher’s perspective.

Before I delve into the minuet details of each philosopher’s respective opinions, I would first like to put forth three definitions of free will, and what they mean contextually. To a Hard Determinist like Blatchford, free will would be having a will that could override one’s heredity, or temperament, and one’s environment, or training, which - as a determinist and believer in the hierarchal scheme in which heredity and environment are at the top and ruling man, who is below it, who in turn rules his or her own will – would be impossible. To a Libertarian like Campbell, free will is only applicable to a situation if one is the sole author of the act, and if there is a real sense that one could have acted otherwise . Where Blatchford sees heredity and environment, or moral responsibility, as the sole force behind acts and subsequently, free will, Campbell sees freedom as a precondition of moral responsibility. As an indeterminist, my perception of free will is more exclusive to the individuals’ self-interest regarding their decisions, as I will illustrate farther in the essay. The recurring theme that the three of us share is that we all recognize the prevalence of moral responsibility in regards to how free our actions truly are, but Blatchford’s unflinching and adamant perspective regarding what he calls the “delusion” of free will is what sets him apart from Campbell and I.

Robert Blatchford is a Hard Determinist . He presents his argument in a way which leaves little room for objection, as is exemplified through the absolution of his words when discussing what he believes to be the non-existence of free will. The foundations of Blatchford’s philosophy are grounded in the two pillars of the aforementioned ‘heredity’ and ‘environment’, both which he see’s to be proof that, not only is free will a delusion, but we are all Determinists. Although the insistence and unflinching conviction behind his words may portray him as ignorant to some, Blatchford manages to cover many objections to his argument, and in doing so, solidifies the premise of his philosophy regarding free will, or the lack thereof.

We’ll start with the matter of what Heredity and Environment are, and why they play such a pivotal role in the formation of Blatchford’s’ argument. Blatchford presents the words ‘Heredity’ and ‘Temperament’ as interchangeable, as that which rules ones’ nature , the way in which one behaves, and those very intrinsic characteristics that, he argues, are impossible to remove from any choice or action. One example of the prominence of Heredity would be in a situation where a man has recently been broken up with by a girlfriend who has previously broken up with him three or four times: each time she had broken up with him and eventually decided she wanted to be with him again, and he always agreed, despite any feelings he may have had of anger towards her, and despite the fact that he may have sworn that he would not get back together with her. Despite his better judgement, or any pain she caused him, it is in this man’s nature and his bare personality to get back together with his ex-girlfriend; although it is the fourth time she left him, and he swore he wouldn’t get back together with her, his Heredity will overrule any other feelings and he will get back together with her.

According to Blatchford the same feeling of helplessness is applicable in a situation regarding ‘environment’ or ‘training’, which are also two synonymous words that refer to one’s exposure and upbringing, more of the physical seeping one’s “will” as opposed to the more intro-centric heredity. Environment is prevalent in most people’s childhoods, as they are drilled with moral responsibility and very strict ideas of what is the societal norm regarding right and wrong, which will carry through and have a profound effect on how they act later in life, making them more predictable or ‘determined’, but more importantly, it is the unspoken rules that one is raised with and the actions of those around them that manifest are translated into this “environment” which will play a large role in dictating how one chooses to act. It is because of that Environment and Heredity that Blatchford finds the will impossible as he sees them omnipresent and undeniable.

Now that Heredity and Environment have been more clarified, it’s important to discern how Blatchford uses them as a crutch for his argument, and consequently, for ‘disproving’ free will. Blatchford poses a few questions to himself, from the perspective of what he believes to be an indeterminist who is trying to contradict determinism: can’t man make choices? Can one not be conscious that they are acting how they wish to act? How does man chose between two acts, or do something that they do not want to do? What is happening when one is hesitating while performing an act? Blatchford’s answer for each question is essentially the same: Heredity and Environment. He replies that yes, man makes choices, but Heredity and Environment are that which cause him to choose and make his decision. They also are that behind what man “wishes”, and they settle the decision between two courses of action, and “hesitation” is merely a conflict of Heredity and Environment. With this argument that is almost circular, Blatchford adopts a mentality that cannot be disproved but cannot be proved either; Blatchford states that anyone denying his theory is denying “the commonest and most obvious facts of life”.

Despite the arrogance with which Blatchford presents his philosophy, his ultimate and penultimate points are those which cement it as a very legitimate argument. His premise is as follows: we can predict the actions of people in certain situations, and for that reason alone they must not be able to do other than what they do, therefore, they could not have done otherwise. Although Blatchford does not leave room for situations in which one is unpredictable or is random, he does take that syllogism one step farther by suggesting that there is nothing inherently different between the aforementioned “people” and everyone else in the world, so he reasons that all people could not do otherwise than they do . He goes on to impose the notion that – not only is he completely correct in his assertions – everyone is actually a Determinist. He backs up that accusation with an example: he says that parents tend to control and shelter their children, and that doing that only makes sense if one believes that such things will have a causal affect on their child, and that this means that people believe that their children, and the subsequent adults they become, are causally determined by past events . Blatchford not only re-enforces his claim with widely acknowledged and accepted information, but by additionally sticking his opinion on others and calling it theirs, as well as his.

In the same way that Blatchford depends upon Heredity and Environment to cement his ideas in his reader’s mind, Campbell also implements two basic idea’s as the centrefold of his philosophy regarding free will. Campbell clarifies his ideas in a way that not only simplifies them, therefore making them more universal and less daunting, but also representing the other side of his argument in a way that Blatchford does not. Campbell explains that moral freedom must pertain to inner acts, as overt acts are controlled by a plethora of factors that we cannot accurately gauge. He also addresses the idea of moral responsibility as problematic, but laments that we must decipher free will in its traditional, ethical sense , before we tackle that issue. Campbell goes completely against Blatchford’s opinion that “we are all determinists”, saying that mankind is “inescapably convinced” that we have free will, and that it is specified, pertaining to man having the freedom to decided whether or not to exert or withhold the moral effort needed to rise to duty where the pressure of its desiring nature is felt to urge it in a contrary direction . Even Blatchford would have to agree that this argument makes sense primarily because man is enamoured with power and a feeling of control and that is precisely what having free will and being able to exercise it, would be.

Campbell has two key concepts that are integral in the piecing together of his argument, the first being that in order to be partaking in a free act, one must be the sole author of said act . Although the words “sole author” may seem relatively straightforward, sole does not necessarily mean alone; there may not be any other determinist of the act, external to the self, as the act would no longer be self-determined and the author would become a partial author . If one is a part-author then they are only responsible for that which they do solely, and then the amount of free will being executed has diminished significantly.

Blatchford would immediately object to Campbell’s reasoning, as Blatchford would see the notion of being a “sole author” to be impossible, as Heredity and Environment would not leave room for a sole author in any experience. As for the concept of a “part-author”, Blatchford would find that to be like admitting defeat to one’s own argument, as they are only “partly” executing free will. He might admire Campbell’s respect for the fact that Campbell doesn’t think free will is available to be used in any situation, and that there are definitely times when one cannot act freely. Conversely, Campbell might endorse Blatchford’s thoughts regarding the absence of free will in situations, but not to the zealous degree that Blatchford takes it to, as Campbell believes that people think that they are in possession of free will, regardless of whether or not they truly are, which is cause in itself to think it exists to some point, however small that point may be.

Campbell’s second key point in his debate is pertaining to an act of which one is the sole author, and where there must be a real sense that one could have acted otherwise . Despite the blatancy of its message, Campbell added two subsections to this concept: it is not good enough to say that one could have acted otherwise had they chosen otherwise, as this is a fragile feeling of freedom, and simple to achieve if there is no compulsion involved; he also states that it is not good enough to say that one could have acted otherwise if one was in a different situation or had a different constitutional make-up . Campbell elucidates that the latter statement is weak because everyone is free in that sense, and that he is concerned with the specifics.

As a Hard Determinist, Blatchford would dismiss the “sense” of being able to do otherwise as a fallacy, and explain that no one could do otherwise regardless of whether or not they sense that they could. Campbell agrees with Blatchford in the sense that he thinks that there isn’t a whole lot for free will to do, but that free will is an issue when one’s duty and desire are in conflict; this notion is aligned with Libertarian theory, as moral responsibility arises when one must resolve a conflict between duty and desire.

Having exhausted the arguments between the Determinist and Libertarian, it is not my turn to spin my opinion of indeterminism into the mix. I think that free will is that which one exercises when making a decision, choice, and so on, as internally and subjectively to themselves as they possibly can, so that what they are doing is in accordance with what they truly want. I think that Blatchford is foolish and narrow-minded in his argument, as he states that outside influence takes away control from that person, and therefore means that they do not have free will on the matter. If someone went and lived, completely isolated, somewhere on a mountain, their decisions and thoughts would constantly be influence by that around them: weather, behavioural patterns of animals, ultimately anything that would cross their path, and this influence would not make them a part-author, it would just have a very small, finite effect on them, which would attach itself to the amorphous conglomeration of that which is human character and consciousness, and help the person make their decision. It would still be their decision, but – as it is impossible to live an objective life without influence, and because there is definitely such thing as free will – they would be deciding based on what they absorbed from others, and how it translated into their own opinion. This ‘influence’ is exaggerated to a very severe extent in the bright and flashy contemporary culture of the western world, which is incredibly media-centric, but unless there are physical forces compulsing one to do something, or restraining one from doing something, the one has the will to decide where or not they will do x or y.

I am an indeterminist because I think that people are capable of making completely un-predictable decisions on impulse, and that people can be forced to do that which we may not want to do, but that there is always room for another choice. Moral responsibility and societal values do hinder people’s actions to some extent, but there are millions of people who act against said moral restrictions, and are penalized for disobeying cultural etiquette, contextually. Additionally, the Heredity and Environment which Blatchford so ruthlessly promotes are real influences that do impact one’s decision making process, but so are millions of other miniscule things that people are confronted with every single day that they absorb, and which subsequently shape their character.

The search for an answer regarding free will may seem fruitless, but all it takes is a moment, a pause, and the consideration of any action one may have done or is doing, to realize that we are so full of conviction in every action we make, and so passionate and invested in all our decisions, that – regardless of whether or not we are the true authors of our actions – we must have free will; because I can choose to stop typing right now and you can choose to stop reading this; because we feel that we can do whatever we choose, regardless of the consequences. We are balls of clay, composed from billions of fragments, each one containing a fleck of our personage, that which shapes us, and consequently makes us choose what we do. Blatchford and Campbell both understood this to the extent that they saw it as something which controlled us, constrained and confined us, but I see it as liberating. We aren’t original, in the sense that not every notion that crosses our mind will be objective and removed from the media, or our family or peer groups, but we are original in the sense that we are a unique combination, we are influenced by a completely individual set of Heredity’s and Environment’s, and they will forever help us in our choices. We are free; we are balls of clay.